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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses two questions: What information should a manager acquire personally and when
should the manager delegate the acquisition of information to subordinates? Among the many potential
sources of information in the environment which s,ources should a manager monitor on a regular basis
and which ones should he/she access only in response to a need for specific information? Borrowing the
notion of asset specificity from transaction cost theory, the paper develops the concept of information
specificity and argues that the answers to both these questions will depend on the specificity of the
information being sought.
1. INTRODUCTION reviews the existing literature on how and where managers
acquire information. Section 4 examines the assumptions
There exists a considerable body of literature on how of transaction cost theory in the context of managerial
managers acquire and process information (Keegan 1974; information processing. In section 5, we propose four
Mintzberg 1975; Kurke and Aldrich 1983; Dollinger 1984). strategies managers can use to acquire information, while in
Much of this research has focused on two areas: Where do section 6, we develop the concept of information specifi-
managers acquire information? Or, how do managers select city. Section 7 defines the transaction costs associated with
channels/sources of information (Culnan 1983; O'Reilly the acquisition of information by managers. In section 8,
1982; Swanson 1987, 1992)? How do managers acquire we develop propositions relating the information acquisition
information? Or, how do managers select media to acquire strategies to the specificity of the information being ac-
or to communicate information (Daft and Lengel 1984, quired. We conclude in section 9 with some suggestions1986)? for future research.
One area that has not received as much attention is: What 2. TRANSACrION COST THEORY
information do managers acquire? In particular, as Zmud
(1990) points out, "More comprehensive examinations of Transaction cost theory addresses Ihe question: When does
managers' personal information behaviors are desirable. Of a company acquire an asset by making it internally, over a
particular importance are studies aimed at understanding hierarchy, versus acquiring it over a market? The theory
which of these behaviors tend to be delegated, the extent argues that companies will choose the alternative that
they are delegated, and why they are delegated." In this minimizes the sum of the production and transaction costs
paper, we borrow, and adapt, concepts from transaction cost for acquiring the asset. Given that markets, through spe-
theory to address the question: When do managers delegate cialization and economies of scale, usually have an advan-
the task of acquiring information and when do they perform tage in production costs, firms will vertically integrate only
the task themselves? We develop the notion of information in cases of market failure: that is, when the transaction
specificity and use it as the basis for hypothesizing on the costs of market exchange are sufficiently high to offset any
information acquisition choices made by managers. advantage that markets may have in production costs.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 The theory assumes that economic actors have bounded
briefly describes transaction cost theory while section 3 rationality and will, if given the opportunity, engage in
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opportunistic behavior. The theory further assumes that the the concerns were targeting feedback, receiver accessibility,
exchange process is beset with a degree of uncertainty so and tailoring information.
that it is not possible ex-ante to write a complete contract
that anticipates all possible contingencies. 3.2 How Managers Access Information
Under the above assumptions, the choice between markets Several different perspectives attempt to explain why
and hierarchies is determined by the level of asset- managers choose ce tain media to access and communicate
specificity, or the extent to which an exchange is supported information. Short, Williams and Christie (1976) charac-
by transaction-specific investments. Transaction-specific terized communication media in terms of their ability to
investments are defined as "durable investments that are facilitate interaction and awareness of others in the com-
undertaken in support of particular transactions, the oppor- munication. This view was expanded upon by Daft and
tunity cost of which investments is much lower in altema- Lengel (1984, 1986) who argued, in their media richness
tive uses or by alternative users" (Williamson 1975, 1985). theory, that media use is determined through a rational
Transactions-that are supported by high levels of asset- process of aligning the richness of the media with the
specificity should be governed by hierarchical structures uncertainty and equivocality of the task.
whereas transactions that require only general purpose
investments will most efficiently be conducted over mar- Others have argued that an individual will use a medium
kets. only if there exists a "critical mass" of users on that
medium (Markus 1987; Rice et al 1990). Fulk et al (1987)
propose a social influence model in which media choice is
3. REVIEW OF THE LrTERATURE ON influenced not only by the objective characteristics of the
MANAGERIAL INFORMATION media and the task but also by social factors such as the
PROCESSING opinions of others and norms of behavior in.the group. A
similar view, based on structuration theory, has also been
As noted earlier, much of the literature to date has focused expressed by Yates and Orlikowski (1992).
on where, and how, managers get the information theyneed.
4. TRANSACTION COST THEORY AND
3.1 Where Managers Get Information MANAGERIAL INFORMATION
ACQUIS]TION
Much research has shown that channel accessibility, and
not the quality of information, is the main criterion used by Transaction cost analysis is generally applied at the organi-
managers in selecting an information source (Allen 1977; zational level of analysis - whether or not an organization
Culnan 1983; Gerstberger and Allen 1968; Hardy 1982; should internalize a transaction. We believe, however, that
O'Reilly 1982; Rice and Shook 1988; Zmud, Lind and the concepts of transaction cost theory can usefully be
Young 1990). Culnan (1984, 1985) defined two dimen- adapted to the individual level of analysis as well. We
sions of accessibility: (1) difficulty in physically accessing begin by arguing that the fundamental assumptions of
a source of information; and (2) difficulty in acquiring transaction cost theory are valid in our problem setting.
information from the source after having obtained physical
access. Swanson (1987) offered a similar view in his Transaction cost theory applies to the acquisition of an
channel disposition model, which examined both the quality asset; that information is an asset is commonly accepted
of information available in a channel and the individual's (King 1984). All managers are boundedly rational (March
access to a channel. Swanson (1992) subsequently refined and Simon 1958) and face uncertainty in their information
the idea of an individual's access to a channel, charac- requirements (Ackoff 1967). It is also widely accepted
terizing it in terms of information-pull (the demander of that individuals frequently engage in opportunistic behavior
information) and information-push (the supplier of informa- by manipulating the information they present to others,
tion). He argued that access to a channel is not a sufficient either deliberately misrepresenting information or restricting
condition to obtain information; the keeper of the informa- others' access to information for personal gain (Pettigrew
tion must also be willing to bear the often hidden costs of 1972; Feldman and March 1981; Zmud 1990).
supplying information.
In the next three sections, we define concepts corres-
Zmud, Lind, and Young (1990)'showed that the capacity to ponding to the three major building blocks of transaction
provide immediate feedback is another critical factor in a cost theory: the information acquisition strategies that can
manager's choice of channels. They found that, for lateral be employed by managers (governance structures in trans-
communication, individuals were concerned with providing action cost theory), information specificity (asset specificity
or obtaining feedback, channel accessibility, and informa- in transaction cost theory), and the transaction costs asso-
tion accessibility, whereas for downward communication, ciated with the acquisition of information.
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Table 1. Managerial Inrormation Acquisition Strategies
Self-Acquisition Delegated Acquisition
Regular Monitoring Relational Hierarchy Relational Market
Focused Search Spot Hierarchy Spot Market
5. MANAGERIAL INFORMATION (1) Regular Self-Monitoring: The manager personally
ACQUISITION STRATEGIES monitors a potential source of information on an on-
going and regular basis. We call this strategy the
Managers must make choices on two dimensions in select- relational hierarchy.
ing a strategy for acquiring information:
(2) Focused Self-Search: The manager, in response to a
(a) Self-Acquisition versus Delegation: This dimension need for specific information, searches the environmenl
is derived directly from transaction cost theory. Analo- to find the best source. We term this strategy the spot
gous to the choice between a hierarchy and a market hierarchy.
faced by a firm acquiring an asset, a manager must
also choose between acquiring information personally (3) Delegated Regular Monitoring: The manager desig-
(the hierarchical strategy) or delegating the acquisition nates a subordinate to monitor a source of information
of the information to a subordinate (the market stra- on an ongoing basis and, on a regular basis, convey
tegy). Clearly, there are significant differences be- relevant information to him/her. We use the term
tween a subordinate and a market, and between a relational market to describe this strategy.
hierarchy and a manager acquiring information person-
ally. Thus, the analogy drawn here is valid only in a (4) Delegated Focused Search: The manager, in response
limited sense. For analysis at the organizational level, to a need for specific information, designates a sub-
the fundamental choice addressed by transaction cost ordinate to search the environment and find the best
theory is whether or not the producer and user of an source. We term this strategy the spot market.
asset are the same entity: in a hierarchy, they are; in a
market, they are not. This dimension addresses a
similar choice at the individual level: that is, when are 6. THE SPECIFIC]TY OF INFORMATION
the user and acquirer of information the same person?
As noted earlier, one of the central tenets of transaction
(b) Regular Monitoring versus Focused Search: This Cost theory is the notion of asset specificity. There are
dimension is motivated by the unique chancteristics of many different forms of asset specificity, such as human
information as an asset and the distinctive nature of
managerial information acquisition as contrasted with specificity, site specificity, physical specificity, and time
the typical transaction to acquire a traditional product specificity. In the context of information, we define two
In general, a firm acquires a product to fill a specific forms of specificity: human specificity (or knowledge
need. Firms do not generally acquire products just in specificity) and time specificity. Within each category, we
case they turn out to be useful. On the other hand, can further distinguish between specificity in use and
managers often need to scan the environment for specificity in acquisition (Table 2).
potentially useful and relevant information without
knowing exactly what information they are looking for. (a) Human Specificity: Information has high human
Given the large number of potential sources of infor- specificity if it is meaningful to only one (or a few)
mation in the environment and the limited time avail- individual(s). Human specificity arises because the
able to managers, a manager must decide which information can only be interpreted in light of specific
sources to monitor on an ongoing basis (regular moni- knowledge possessed by the individual(s) in question.
toring), and which ones to tap only in response to a Thus, human information specificity can also be
need for specific information (focused search).' termed knowledge specificity. Specific knowledge is
not only possessed by a very limited number of indi-
These two dimensions together imply four different infor- viduals, it is also expensive to transfer - "the more
mation acquisition strategies that a manager can follow. costly knowledge is to transfer, the more specific it is,These are shown in Table 1 and explained in greater detail and the less costly the knowledge is to transfer, thebelow. more general it is" Uensen and Meckling 1990).
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Table 2. The Specificity of Information
Time Specificity Human Specificity
Specificity in Acquisition Information that must be Information that can only
captured at a specific point be captured by someone
in time with specific knowledge
Specificity in Use Information that decreases Information that can only
in value unless used soon after it be profitably used by
becomes available someone with the required
specific knowledge
There are two primary forms of specific knowledge: are specific in acquisition as well, because merely to
(a) scientific or technical knowledge, and (b) knowl- know what symptoms to look for and to be able to
edge of context, or knowledge of particular circum- distill the relevant signals, given the patient' s com-
stances of time and place (Hayek 1945; O'Reilly and plaints, from all the various signals that the patient's
Pondy 1979). Thus, the technical knowledge required body may potentially provide, requires specific knowl-
to operate a complex piece of machinery falls in the edge that only the doctor possesses and which cannot
former category while knowledge of the peculiarities of easily be transferred to the nurse.
a machine that an engineer has acquired over years of
operating the machine falls in the latter category. Three other points may be useful to note here. First
Similarly, the professional medical knowledge specific knowledge of context is often acquired by an
possessed by a doctor falls in the former category individual over a period of time as a natural by product
while the detailed knowledge that a doctor possesses of doing his/her job. Second, one reason specific
about the idiosyncrasies of a particular patient that knowledge is expensive to transfer is that it cannot
he/she has treated for a number of years falls in the usually be aggregated meaningfully (Hayek 1945;
latter category. Christie 1993). Finally, information that is human
specific in acquisition is usually specific in use as well:
Further, we can distinguish between specificity in use if being able to capture the information requires spe-
versus spec<ficily in acquisition. Information that is cific knowledge, it is reasonable to expect that the
human specific in use can only be profitably used by same knowledge will be necessary to use the informa-
the person with the necessary specific knowledge; tion as well.
however, the information may initially be acquired by
someone other than this person. On the other hand, (b) Time Specificity: Information can also be time spe-
information that is human specific in its acquisition as cific in its acquisition or in its use. Information is
well is such that only a person with the necessary time specific in acquisition if it must be captured at a
specific knowledge can even acquire the information. specific point in time, otherwise it becomes less useful
A person without this knowledge would not recognize or perhaps even unavailable. For example, scientists at
what information was relevant and useful. the National Seismological Laboratory (NSL) must
capture the magnitude of an earthquake at the time the
Consider an example from the medical field. In a earthquake strikes or it will never be available
doctor's office, a nurse will often measure the tempera- (assuming they are the only ones that monitor earth-
ture and blood pressure of the patient. Doctors will, quake magnitudes). This information is, therefore,
however, usually examine other indicators, such as time specific in acquisition from the point of view of
physical symptoms, themselves. This is because the NSL. Note, however, that the same is not true for
temperature and blood pressure may be specific in a scientist elsewhere doing research on earthquake
use - only a doctor, with his/her specific professional trends over time who can obtain the information from
knowledge, can decide what to do with the informa- the NSL at any time in the future.
tion - but they are not specific in acquisition since it
does not take a doctor' s specialized knowledge to Information is time specific in use if it decreases in
measure a patient's temperature or blood pressure. On value unless used very soon after it first becomes
the other hand, information on the physical symptoms available. An example is a stock quote to a specula-
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tive investor there is usually a very short window of (c) Knowledge Transfer Costs: These are the costs of
time during which this information can be exploited. any knowledge that must be transferred from the user
Again, this same information is not time specific in use to the acquirer in order that the latter can interpret, and
to a researcher studying historical trends in the values acquire, the correct information.
of certain stocks. Information that is time specific in
use is, by extension, time specific in acquisition as (d) Opportunity Costs: These are the costs of missed
well: to use information right after it becomes avail- opportunities or losses suffered because the relevant
able, one must capture it first information was not available to the right person at the
right time.
7. TRANSACTION COSTS
8. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
There are four primary sources of transaction costs in
acquiring information: Following the logic of transaction cost theory, the funda-
mental proposition of this paper is that managers witt
(a) Monitoring/Search Costs: These include the time, choose among the different information acquisition stra-
effort, and money, expended by an individual in either tegies outlined above based on the specificity of the infor-
monitoring a source of information on a regular basis mation. The specific hypotheses are summarized in
Table 3 below.or conducting a focused search for required informa-
tion. From a manager's perspective, these costs are
clearly higher when the information is acquired person- As the table shows, we hypothesize that the time specificityof information determines whether or not an informationally than when the acquisition of the information is source in routinely monitored. The rationale behind this is
delegated to subordinates. Even from the organiza- relatively simple. When information is time specific (eilher
tion' s perspective, if we assume that the manager' s in use or in acquisition), the manager must be sure to
time is more expensive than the potential delegatee' s capture the information as soon as it becomes available.
time, it would seem reasonable to push down as much The only way to be sure of that is to monitor the source of
of the information acquisition task as possible. Fur- the information on an ongoing basis. On the other hand,
ther, these costs are clearly higher when an information information thal is not time specific is probably more
source is routinely monitored - and therefore requires efficiently acquired only on an as needed basis.
an ongoing commitment of resources - versus when
information is acquired via a focused search on an as In terms of the transaction costs defined above, therefore,
needed basis. we are arguing that, for time specific information, the
increased monitoring/search costs incurred by regular
(b) Information Transmission Costs: These are the costs monitoring will be more than offset by the reduced oppor-
of transmitting information from the acquirer to the tunity costs from being sure to capture the right information
user, provided the two are not the same person. These at the right time. On the other hand, for information that is
costs are analogous to the cots of transferring goods not time specific, the efficient choice will be to economize
from a seller to a buyer in a market transaction. on the monitoring/search costs.
Table 3. Hypothesized Information Acquisition Strategies
Human Specificity In Time Specificity (Acquisition or Use)
Acquisition
High Low
High Relational Hierarchy Spot Hierarchy
Low Relational Market Spot Market
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The human specificity dimension, in particular, human The reader may have noticed that the human specificity in
specificity in acquisition, determines whether the manager use dimension does not affect the decision of what informa-
should acquire the information personally or delegate the tion a manager should acquire personally or which sources
task. Information that is human specific in acquisition a manager should routinely monitor. However, the notion
should be acquired by the manager personally. In this case, of human specificity in use can be very critical in deter-
the increased monitoring/search costs will be more than mining an organization's overall infonnation strategy and in
offset by reductions in the information transmission costs, the assignment of decision rights within an organization
in the knowledge transfer costs (since, for someone else to Uensen and Meckling 1990; Christie 1993). A detailed
acquire specific information, the manager must first transfer discussion of these topics is outside the scope of this paper
specific knowledge to that person which, by definition, is but we have nevertheless chosen to define the notion of
expensive to do: having the manager acquire the informa- information specificity as completely as possible in this
tion himself/herself will, therefore reduce these knowledge paper so that the concept can be used as a basis for further
transfer costs), and the opportunity costs (if the transfer of work in different settings.
knowledge to the delegatee is not perfect, the manager may
miss out on vital information: by monitoring the informa-
tion personally, the manager reduces the chances of this 9. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
happening). FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
On the other hand, when the information is not human This paper borrowed, and adapted, notions from transaction
specific in acquisition, the manager may find it efficient to cost theory to address the questions: When should mana-
reduce the monitoring costs by delegating the task to a gers acquire information personally and when should they
subordinate. These savings should more than offset the delegate this task? Which sources of information should a
increased information transmission costs. Further, there manager choose to monitor on a regular basis? We deve-
will not be any increase in the knowledge transfer costs loped the notion of information specificity and its two
(since no specific knowledge is required to acquire this dimensions, human specificity (or knowledge specificity)
information, no knowledge transfer need take place from and time specificity, and argued that the information acqui-
the user to the acquirer, or any knowledge that does need to sition strategy used by a manager will depend on the
be transferred will be general knowledge that is inexpensive specificity of the information being acquired. Clearly, the
to transfer) or in the opportunity costs (since the delegatee ideas presented in this paper need to be tested empirically.
possesses the needed knowledge, the probability of missing
out on vital information should not be much higher than if One area that we did not explore in this paper but which
the manager were to acquire the information personally). should be a fruitful area for future research is the interac-
tion between information technology (IT) and information
Thus, we propose the following four hypotheses: specificity. IT can help to reduce the human specificity of
information, either by helping to establish a context thal
Hypothesis 1. To acquire information that is high allows information of high specificity to be interpreted
in both time specificity and human specificity in away from its initial source, or by facilitating the sharing of
acquisition, managers will use a relational hier- specific knowledge among members of the organization.
archy (regular self monitoring). Expert systems are clearly an attempt to make specific
knowledge more widely available within an organization.
Hypothesis 2: To acquire information that has Similarly, shared databases such as Lotus Notes, or systems
high human specificity in acquisition but low time designed to enhance the size (breadth and depth) and the
specificity, managers will use a spot hierarchy centrality of organizational memory (Walsh and Ungson
(focused self search). 1991; Ackerman and Malone 1990) can facilitate the
sharing of knowledge about particular circumstances of
Hypothesis 3: To acquire information that has time and place that may have been unavailable or uneco-
high time specificity but low human specificity in nomical to share otherwise.
acquisition, managers will use a relational market
approach (delegated routine monitoring). IT can also increase the specificity of information - in
particular, the time specificity of information. By facili-
Hypothesis 4: To acquire information that is low tating more widespread dissemination of information in a
in both time specificity and human specificity in shorter period of time, and by reducing both the feasible
acquisition, managers will use a spot market and the effective response times, IT can often reduce the
(delegated focused search). window of opportunity within which an individual or
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organization must act, thereby making information more Finally, although we have focused this paper at the indivi-
time specific. dual level of analysis, the notion of information specificity
should be useful at the organizational level of analysis as
On the other hand, the specificity of information can well. An organization may be able to use the notion of
restrict where, and' how, information technology can be information specificity to define an overall information
effectively used. Consider the long standing debate on strategy. For instance, the extent to which an organization
whether IT leads to centralization or decentralization. For uses gatekeepers may depend on the distribution of specific
IT to lead to the kinds of centralization effects that Leavitt knowledge within the organization: information that is
and Whisler (1958) predicted, we have to make the as- highly human specific can obviously not be captured by a
sumption that almost all information has low specificity in gatekeeper who does not have the specific knowledge.
use so that the people at the top have the necessary knowl- Where an organization focuses its environmental scanning
edge to use it effectively. This may have been true in the resources will depend on the potential time specificity of
classic hierarchical manufacturing organization, where the the information from the different components of the
production task could be separated from the management of environment. Finally, where information gets routed once
thal task, and much of the information could be meaning- it comes into the organization, and how the organization
fully separated from the context, aggregated by computer, allocates decision rights, will also depend on the distribu-
and sent up to the top levels of management. tion of specific knowledge within the organization and the
specificity in use of the information.
However, we would expect that in the modern adhocracy,
the percent of human specific information is probably much
higher, so thal the decision rights must be located with the 10. REFERENCES
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